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1 Introduction
Population aging is one of the major economic challenges for today's industrialized societies. An
increasing life expectancy in conjunction with declining birth rates tends to reduce the part of the
population in working age and raises the part of the economically dependent old. For instance, the
United Nations predicts for the US a decline in the working-age-to-population ratio, i.e., the fraction
of the 20-64 year old to the 20-90 year old, from 83% in 2007 to 72% in 2075 (UN (2002)). To
meet this challenge it is necessary to understand the economic consequences of such a demographic
change.
This paper studies the economic consequences of the link between demographic changes and the
incentives of rms to engage in innovation investments that aect total factor productivity (TFP).
With a focus on the US economy and the time span between 1950 and 2200, we argue that this
link may substantially modify the predicted positive and normative implications of actual policy
reform proposals of the pension scheme. We obtain these implications in a new dynamic general
equilibrium model with endogenous economic growth and heterogeneous overlapping generations in
the spirit of Auerbach and Kotliko (1987).
We calibrate our model for the US economy and establish the following major results. First, we nd
that the net eect of a decline in population growth on the growth rate of per-capita magnitudes
such as income per capita and consumption per capita is positive and quantitatively signicant.
For instance, under the current pension system the growth rate of per-capita income is predicted
to rise from 1.8% over the period 1990-2000 to approximately 2.28% in 2100. Second, we show that
the pension system indeed matters both for the growth performance of the economy and for the
welfare of each generation. Finally, we show that the assessment of pension reform proposals diers
in an endogenous growth framework as opposed to the standard framework where TFP growth is
exogenous and costless.
Our analytical framework has a supply side that satises two requirements which prove useful for
our research agenda. First, endogenous growth is obtained in a competitive neoclassical economy
where TFP growth is the result of labor-saving innovation investments of prot-maximizing rms
and capital accumulation is subject to diminishing returns. Analytically, this economy can readily
be turned into the standard neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956) with exogenous and costless
technical change. This property is particularly useful for our comparative dynamic analysis that
identies the role of endogenous growth by comparing the predicted evolution of the US economy
under endogenous and exogenous growth. Second, there is a single channel linking the demographic
trend to innovation activities. This parsimony allows for clear-cut intuitions when we compare
policy reform proposals under endogenous and exogenous growth.1
A mechanism often attributed to Hicks (1932) provides the link between the demographic trend
and TFP growth. According to Hicks' argument, a demographic transition that reduces the labor
force may render labor scarcer relative to capital. Accordingly, the relative price of labor increases
and so does the protability of innovation investments that raise labor productivity and TFP.
1We do not want to dispute the possible presence of other channels that may strengthen or weaken the mechanism
expounded here. However, the analytical and the quantitative analysis of such interactions is quite involved. We leave
this question for future research and shall get back to this point in the concluding Section 7.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 2
Figure 1 provides evidence for the US economy in support of Hicks' intuition. It shows the long-run
relationship between the average annual growth rates of the labor force and of output per hour
worked in the US for ve successive twenty-year intervals covering the 20th century.2 The striking
feature is the strong inverse relationship between both magnitudes: when the growth rate of the
labor force declines then the growth rate of output per hour worked increases.
Figure 1: 20th Century U.S. Labor Force and Productivity Growth
We interpret this negative correlation as the result of two reinforcing eects. First, reduced labor
force growth weakens the eect of capital dilution, i.e., a given amount of capital implies a higher
capital intensity and a higher labor productivity. We follow Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner, and Summers
(1990) and refer to this channel as the Solow eect. Second, since capital and labor are complements
and capital accumulation is subject to diminishing returns, rms that anticipate a higher capital
intensity due to the Solow eect will also expect a higher real wage and a lower real interest rate.
Both price movements strengthen the incentives of such rms to engage in labor-saving innovation
investments that raise labor productivity and TFP. We refer to this second channel as the Hicks
eect.3
The relevance of Hicks' argument hinges on the economy's ability to accumulate capital, i.e., on the
propensity of a declining population in working age to save. Hence, to account for the Hicks eect
we have to allow rms to adjust their innovation investments and households to adjust their savings
decision to a changing demographic environment. To provide for such an analytical framework we
2Our Figure 1 replicates and extends Figure 1 in Romer (1987), p. 182, by showing that the inverse relationship
between both growth rates persists for the period 1979-1999. See Appendix 8.1 for detailed information concerning
the data used.
3Additional evidence supporting Hicks' intuition is provided by Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner, and Summers (1990).
These authors' cross-country regressions establish a negative and signicant partial correlation between productivity
growth and labor force growth. Moreover, several cross-country growth regressions nd a negative and signicant
partial correlation between population growth and growth of per-capita GDP (see, e.g., Barro and Sala- -Martin
(2004), Kelley and Schmidt (1995), and Kormendi and Meguire (1985)). In a famous study, Habakkuk (1962) uses
ideas similar to the Hicksian argument to explain why technological progress in the 19th century was faster in the US
than in Britain.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 3
combine the production sector of Irmen (2005) with a household sector comprising heterogeneous
overlapping generations of Auerbach and Kotliko (1987).4 Since the pension system is a major
determinant of an economy's propensity to save, this framework is well suited for our comparative
institutional analysis that asks how institutional characteristics of the pension scheme aect the
incentive to engage in labor-saving technical change during a demographic transition.
Our research builds on and contributes to a recent and growing literature that extends the seminal
framework of Auerbach and Kotliko (1987) to analyze the economic consequences of population
aging in dierent settings. To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature does neither incor-
porate the endogenous response of rms to the demographic transition through the Hicks eect, nor
does it provide an analysis of the consequences of policy reforms in endogenous growth economies.5
The present study is a rst step to ll this gap.
Important existing contributions study the consequences of policy reform proposals of the social
security system in closed economies. For instance, Huang, _ Imrohoro glu, and Sargent (1997), Conesa
and Kr uger (1999), and Fuster, _ Imrohoro glu, and _ Imrohoro glu (2007) deal with the transition from
an unfunded to a more funded pension scheme, where the latter two emphasize political economy
aspects of such a switch. Closer to our analysis are the studies of _ Imrohoro glu, _ Imrohoro glu, and
Joines (1995) and de Nardi, _ Imrohoro glu, and Sargent (1999) who focus on reform scenarios within
the pay-as-you-go system and assess their welfare implications. With respect to their results, our
ndings suggests that i) the welfare ranking of reform proposals may depend on whether economic
growth is exogenous as in their papers or endogenous as in our study, and ii) the welfare eects are
much larger if economic growth is endogenous.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and establishes the stationary
equilibrium. Section 3 develops important channels that drive our calibration results in a simplied
setting with two-period lived individuals. Section 4 provides the detailed description of our calibra-
tion strategy. Our main ndings concerning the interplay between the demographic transition and
economic growth appear in Section 5. We begin in Section 5.1 with the analysis of a benchmark
economy where the replacement rate of the pension system is constant and the growth rate of TFP
is endogenous. We establish that the feedback from population growth onto innovation incentives
generates faster productivity growth. Section 5.2 contains our comparative dynamical analysis. It
studies the evolution of the benchmark economy under the assumption of costless exogenous growth
at the trend growth rate of the US. Here, we show that accounting for the Hicks eect substantially
increases the growth rate of per-capita GDP. In Section 6, we turn to the comparative institutional
analysis of pay-as-you-go pensions schemes with dierent characteristics. Section 6.1 considers three
pension reform proposals and studies their implications for economic growth. Section 6.2 deals with
the welfare implications of these reform proposals, both under endogenous and exogenous growth.
Section 7 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
4The production side of Irmen (2005) satises the aforementioned attributes. It extends the production sector
employed by Hellwig and Irmen (2001) which in turn builds on Bester and Petrakis (2003).
5A previous version of Ludwig, Schelke, and Vogel (2008) included an analysis of endogenous growth through
endogenous human capital investments of the households and a growth mechanism along the lines of Lucas (1988).
These authors do not compare dierent reform proposals of the pension scheme.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 4
2 The Model
This section describes our large-scale OLG model with heterogeneous agents in the spirit of Auerbach
and Kotliko (1987) and a production sector extending the setup studied in Irmen (2005).
There is nal-good sector and an intermediate-good sector. Intermediate-good rms undertake
innovation investments that increase the productivity of their workers. These productivity gains
drive the evolution of the economy's level of technological knowledge and its TFP. Intermediates
and capital produce nal output that can be consumed or invested. If invested, the current nal
good may either serve as future capital or as an input in innovation investments. In each period,
prices are expressed in units of the current nal good.
The government collects taxes, accidental bequests, and social security contributions. In all periods,
the budget of the government and the one of the pension scheme are balanced.
2.1 Demographics and Timing
A period, t, corresponds to one year. At each t, a new generation of households is born. Newborns
have a real life age of 20 denoted by s = 1. All generations retire at age 65 (s = R = 46) and live
up to a maximum age of 94 (s = J = 75). At t, all agents of age s survive until age s + 1 with
probability t;s where t;0 = 1 and t;J = 0.
Let Nt(s) denote the number of agents of age s at t. The population Nt(s) of the periods t =
0;1;:::;450 is calibrated as the actual and predicted US population of the years 1950 to 2400 using
the data of Kr uger and Ludwig (2007).
2.2 Households
Each household comprises one worker. Households maximize intertemporal utility at the beginning









where  > 0 denotes the discount factor, and per-period utility u(c;l) is a function of consumption
c and labor supply l
u(c;l) =
 
c(1   l)1 1    1
1   
;  > 0;  2 (0;1): (2)
Households are heterogeneous with regard to their age, s, their individual labor eciency, e(s;j),
and their wealth, !. We stipulate that an agent's eciency e(s;j) =  ysj depends on its age, s 2
S  f1;2;:::;75g and its eciency type, j 2 E  f"1;"2g. The purpose is to capture composition
eects that, e.g., G omez and Hern andez de Cos (2008) nd relevant in explaining cross-countryPopulation, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 5
growth dierences. We choose the age-eciency prole, f ysg, in accordance with the US wage
prole. The permanent eciency types 1 and 2 are meant to capture dierences in education and
ability. We use   to denote the unique invariant distribution of j 2 E.
The net wage income in period t of an s-year old household with eciency type j is given by
(1 w b;t)wte(s;j)lt(s), where wt denotes the wage rate per eciency unit in period t. The wage
income is taxed at the constant rate w. Furthermore, the worker has to pay contributions to the
pension system at rate b;t which may vary over time depending on the pension scheme. A retired
worker receives pensions b(s;j) that depend on his eciency type j. Clearly, b(s;j) = 0 for s < R.
Households are born without assets at the beginning of age s = 1, hence !t(1) = 0. Parents do
not leave bequests to their children, and all accidental bequests are conscated by the government.
The household earns interest rt on his wealth !t 2 R. Capital income is taxed at the constant rate
r. In addition, households receive lump-sum transfers trt from the government. As a result, the
budget constraint at t of an s-year old household with productivity type j and wealth !t is:
bt(s;j) + (1   w   b;t)wte(s;j)lt(s) + [1 + (1   r)rt]!t(s) + trt
= ct(s) + !t+1(s + 1):
(3)
2.3 Firms
Firms belong either to the nal-good or to the intermediate-good sector. Both sectors are compet-
itive.
2.3.1 Final Goods
The measure of all nal-good rms is equal to one. At each t, rms produce output, Yt, according
to the following Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = K
t X1 
t ; 0 <  < 1; (4)
where Kt is the capital input at t and Xt denotes the amount of the intermediate good used in
period-t production. Let pt denote the price of the intermediate good at t, and  2 [0;1] the rate
at which capital depreciates within periods. Firms rent capital from households and return 1 + rt
units of their output per unit of rented capital. Moreover, they pay ptXt to the intermediate-goods
producers. Hence, per-period prots are
Yt   rtKt   ptXt   Kt: (5)
Firms take the sequence of prices frt;ptg as given and maximize the sum of the present discounted
values of prots in all periods. This is equivalent to a series of one-period maximization problems
and gives rise to the rst-order conditions
@Yt
@Kt




= pt = (1   ) ~ K
t ; (7)Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 6
where ~ Kt  Kt=Xt denotes the capital intensity in the nal-good sector in period t.
2.3.2 Intermediate Goods
The set of all intermediate-good rms is represented by the set R+ of nonnegative real numbers
with Lebesgue measure.
Technology All rms have access to the same technology and face a capacity limit of 1.6 The







where at and ld
t denote the rm's labor productivity and its labor input, respectively. Firms hire
eective labor, ld
t, dened as the product of the eciency factor e(s;j) and the `number' of working
hours lt(s). Labor is assumed to be divisible between rms.
The individual rm's labor productivity at t depends on both the indicator of the economy-wide level
of labor productivity At 1 of period t   1 and its individual productivity growth rate qt according
to
at = At 1(1 + qt): (9)
In order to achieve productivity growth at rate qt, the rm must invest i(qt) units of the nal
good in period t   1. The input requirement function is increasing and strictly convex in qt. More
specically, we stipulate
i(q) = v0qv; with v0 > 0 and v > 1: (10)
Following Hellwig and Irmen (2001), the innovation reected in at is proprietary knowledge of the
rm only for production in period t; afterwards it becomes common knowledge.7 The evolution of
At over time is described below.
Prot Maximization and Zero-Prots A rm's innovation investment fully depreciates after
one year. Therefore, the cost of an innovation investment undertaken at t   1 in units of the nal
good at t is (1 + rt)i(qt). With wtld
t denoting a rm's wage bill, a production plan fxt;ld
t;qtg for
period t yields the prot
t = pt xt   wt ld
t   (1 + rt)i(qt): (11)
6The capacity limit of 1 is a shortcut that has no bearing on the evolution of any magnitude of interest in the
present model. It may be endogenized along the lines set out in Hellwig and Irmen (2001).
7A consequence of this assumption is that an intermediate-good rm can produce at t with a technology involving
at = At 1 if it decides not to undertake an innovation investment in t   1. However, this possibility does not arise in
equilibrium.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 7
Firms take the sequence of real prices fpt;wt;rtg as well as the sequence of aggregate productivity
indicators fAt 1g as given and maximize the sum of the present discounted values of prots in all
periods. Since production choices for dierent periods are independent of each other, for each t
they choose the plan fxt;ld
t;qtg to maximize the prots t from this plan.
If a rm innovates then it incurs an investment cost (1+ rt)i(qt) that is independent of the level of
output. Hence, an innovation investment can only be prot-maximizing if the margin per unit of
output is strictly positive, i.e., pt   wt=at > 0. Since this margin is independent of the amount of
produced output, an innovating rm produces the capacity output xt = 1. Accordingly, (8) delivers






Upon substitution of the latter in (11), the prot-maximizing productivity growth rate is






  (1 + rt)i(q)

: (13)
The corresponding rst-order condition balances the advantage of a lower wage bill and the disad-
vantage of a higher investment cost. It is sucient for an interior solution and given by
wt
At 1(1 + ^ qt)2 = (1 + rt)iq(^ qt) = (1 + rt)v0 v (^ qt)
v 1 : (14)
This condition shows that, indeed, the incentive to engage in labor saving innovation investments
depends on (relative) factor prices. If rms face a higher wage, then, ceteris paribus, an increase
in qt implies a larger reduction in the wage bill. Similarly, a higher real interest rate reduces
innovation incentives since, ceteris paribus, it raises marginal investment costs. This is the sense
in which prot-maximizing rms adjust their innovation investments to changing factor prices as
conjectured by Hicks: if wt=(1 + rt), i.e., the relative price of labor, increases they invest more.
2.3.3 Consolidating the Production Sector
Denote nt the measure of the set of all active rms in the intermediate-good sector at t. Since all
rms have access to the same technology and face identical prices, all active rms choose the same
production plan f1;1=(At 1 (1 + ^ qt)); ^ qtg.
In equilibrium, active intermediate-good rms must earn zero prots, i.e.,8
t (^ qt;pt;wt;rt;At 1) = 0: (15)
The following lemma shows that the conditions for prot-maximization and zero-prots in the nal-
good and the intermediate-good sector relate the growth rate of labor productivity ^ qt to the capital
intensity in the nal-good sector, ~ Kt.
8This follows since the labor supply in each period is bounded. Therefore, the set of producing intermediate-good
rms that employ more than some  > 0 units of eective labor must have bounded measure, i.e., it must be smaller
than the set of all intermediate-good rms. Since inactive intermediate-good rms must be maximizing prots just
like active ones, we need that maximum prots of intermediate-good rms at equilibrium prices are equal to zero. See
Hellwig and Irmen (2001) for more details.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 8
Lemma 1 If all rms in the economy maximize prots and earn zero-prots, i.e., equations (6),




with g (0) = 0,









Lemma 1 provides the link between the equilibrium incentive to innovate and the capital intensity.
Intuitively, prot-maximization in the nal-good sector as stated in (6) and (7) means that a higher
~ Kt lowers the real interest rate and raises the price of the intermediate good. Both price movements





reects the eect of these price movements onto the prot-maximizing level of innovation
activity implied by (14). We shall later see that in equilibrium the capital intensity, ~ Kt, is a measure
of the relative abundance of capital with respect to ecient labor. Thus, Lemma 1 links the relative
abundance of factors to innovation incentives as envisaged by Hicks: if capital is abundant relative
to ecient labor then the incentive to engage in labor-saving innovation investments is high.
Turning to the evolution of the economy-wide indicator of technological knowledge, we assume
that At = maxfat(n) = At 1 (1 + ^ qt(n))jn 2 [0;nt]g: Since in equilibrium the productivity of all
producing intermediate-good rms is at = At 1(1 + ^ qt), we have At = at and
At = At 1 (1 + ^ qt): (16)
Moreover, in equilibrium the aggregate demand for innovation investment at t   1 is nti(^ qt), the
aggregate demand for eective labor at t is ntld
t = nt=(At 1 (1 + ^ qt)), and the aggregate supply of
the intermediate good at t is nt.
2.4 Government
The government collects income taxes Tt in order to nance its expenditure on government consump-
tion Gt and transfers Trt. In addition, it conscates all accidental bequests Beqt. The government
budget is balanced in every period t, i.e.,
Gt + Trt = Tt + Beqt: (17)
In view of the tax rates w and r, the government's tax revenue is
Tt = wwtLt + rrt
t; (18)
where 
t is aggregate wealth at t.
Government spending is a constant fraction of nal-good output
Gt =  g Yt: (19)Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 9
2.5 Social Security
The social security system is a pay-as-you-go system. The social security authority collects con-
tributions from the workers to nance its pension payments to the retired agents. Pensions are a
constant fraction of the net labor income of the productivity type j
bt(s;j) =
(
0 s < R
(1   w   b;t)wtj lt s  R;
(20)
where  lt denotes the average hourly labor supply of all workers in period t.
In equilibrium, the social security budget is balanced and will be dened below. As to the institu-
tional characteristics of the pension scheme we will distinguish three dierent scenarios during the
transition:
1. constant replacement ratio: t  bt
(1 w b)wt lt = ,
2. constant contribution rate starting in period t0: b;t = b;t0 for t  t0,
3. constant replacement ratio and later retirement at age 70, i.e. R = 51.
2.6 Stationary Equilibrium
In the stationary equilibrium, individual behavior is consistent with the aggregate behavior of the
economy, rms maximize prots, households maximize intertemporal utility, and factor and goods'
markets clear. To express the equilibrium in terms of stationary variables only, we have to divide
aggregate quantities by Xt and individual variables and prices by At. Therefore, we dene the




; ~ Tt =
Tt
Xt








; ~ Ct =
Ct
Xt








; ~ wt 
wt
At
; ~ bt 
bt
At
; ~ !t 
!t
At




Let ft denote the cross-section measure of households in period t.
A stationary equilibrium for a government policy fr;w;b;t;  g;t;trtg, an initial value A0 > 0, and
initial measures f0 in period 0 corresponds to a price system, an allocation, and a sequence of
aggregate productivity indicators fAtg that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Population grows at the rate t =
Nt+1
Nt   1.
2. The `number' of intermediate-good rms, nt, is equal to the total output of intermediates as
each rms produces one unit of output, xt = 1
nt = Xt: (21)Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 10
3. The aggregate productivity indicator, At evolves according to (16).
4. Labor market equilibrium: Aggregate ecient labor supply, Lt, is equal to the aggregate labor
demand of all intermediate-good rms
Lt = ntld
t: (22)
5. Capital market equilibrium: aggregate wealth is equal to aggregate capital plus aggregate
innovation investment

t = Kt + ntit(qt):
6. Households maximize the intertemporal utility (1) subject to the budget constraint
~ bt(s;j) + (1   w   b;t) ~ wt e(s;j)lt(~ !;s;j) + [1 + (1   r)rt] ~ !t + ~ trt
= ~ ct(s) + ~ !t+1(1 + qt+1):





= (1   w   b;t) ~ wte(s;j); (23)
~ ct(s)(1 ) 1(1   lt(s))(1 )(1 ) = (1 + qt+1)(1 ) 1t;s [1 + (1   r)rt+1] (24)
 ~ ct+1(s + 1)(1 ) 1(1   lt+1(s + 1))(1 )(1 ):
Individual labor supply lt(~ !;s;j), consumption ~ ct(~ !;s;j) and optimal next period assets
~ !0
t(~ !;s;j) of period t are functions of the individual state variables ~ !, j, and s, and also
depend on the period t.
7. Firms maximize prots satisfying (6), (7) and (14). In equilibrium, rm prots are zero. Using
(16), the zero-prot condition (15) can be rewritten as follows
~ wt = (1   ) ~ K
t   (1 + rt)i(qt): (25)
8. Aggregate variables are equal to the sum of the individual variables
Lt =
Z
e(s;j)lt(~ !;s;j) ft(d~ !  ds  dj);
~ 









(1   t+1;s+1)(1 + rt+1(1   r))~ !0







(1   t+1;s+1)(1 + rt+1(1   r))~ !0





~ ct(~ !;s;j)ft(d~ !  ds  dj);
~ Tt = w ~ wt + rrt( ~ Kt + i(qt)):Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 11
9. The government budget is balanced
 g ~ K
t + ~ trt
Nt
Lt
= ~ Tt + ~ Beqt: (26)




~ bt(s;j)ft(d~ !  ds  dj) = b;t ~ wt; (27)
11. The market for the nal good clears.
12. The cross-sectional measure ft evolves as




(~ !;s;j); ~ W  S  E

ft(d~ !  ds  dj)
for all sets ~ W, S, E, where the Markov transition function Pt is given by
Pt





> > > <
> > > :
t(s) if ~ !0
t(~ !;s;j) 2 ~ W;
j 2 E;s + 1 2 S
0 else;
and for the newborns




 (E) if 0 2 ~ W
0 else:
3 Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth in a
Simplied Setting
In this section, we show that the relationship between population growth and endogenous economic
growth depends on the characteristics of the pay-as-you-go pension scheme. We make this point is
a simplied setting that combines the production sector of Section 2.3 with a household sector  a la
Diamond (1965). We establish the existence of a steady state and study the steady-state response
of the economy's growth rate to a decline in its population growth rate. We nd that the rise of the
steady-state growth rate caused by a decline in population growth is larger under a pension scheme
that keeps the contribution rate constant than under a scheme with a constant replacement rate.
We shall see in Section 6 that the calibration exercises bring out these qualitative ndings, too.
For ease of exposition, we set the depreciation rate equal to unity and assume v0 = 1 and v = 2. On
the household side, we consider two-period lived households. Generations comprise homogeneous
individuals. The labor supply when young is exogenous and normalized to one, the one when old
is zero. The population growth rate, , is constant over time and coincides with the growth rate of
aggregate labor supply, i.e.,  = Lt+1=Lt   1.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 12
3.1 Households and the Pay-As-You-Go Pension Scheme
Lifetime utility of a member of cohort t is
lnc
y
t +  lnco




t+1 denote per-capita consumption when young and old, respectively. The maximiza-
tion of (28) is subject to the per-period budget constraints
c
y
t + st = (1   b)wt; and co
t+1 = st(1 + rt+1) + bt+1; (29)












First, we consider a pay-as-you-go system with a constant contribution rate b 2 (0;1). Leaving
intragenerational heterogeneity and taxes on wage income aside, the benets at t+1 implied by the
balanced budget satisfy bt+1 Lt = Lt+1b wt+1 such that
bt+1 = (1 + )b wt+1: (31)
3.2 The Dynamical System
We use ~ Kt as the state variable of the dynamical system. To express the savings of the young as a
function of this state variable we employ Lemma 1 to nd the equilibrium real wage as





















Accordingly, a rise in the capital intensity ~ Kt aects the wage in three ways. First, a higher ~ Kt
raises nal-good output. Second, a rise in ~ Kt renders labor scarcer such that the productivity
growth rate g( ~ Kt) rises. Third, faster productivity growth increases investment outlays. The rst
two channels increase the wage, the last decreases it.9 Observe that (32) gives the same real
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9See Appendix 8.2.2 for the proof of the last part of this statement.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 13
In these units, the real wage at t is equal to the dierence between nal-good output and overall
debt service payments.
In equilibrium, the savings of the young must be equal to aggregate investment, i.e.,
st Lt = Kt+1 + nt+1 i(qt+1): (34)
Using Lemma 1, optimal savings (30), the budget of the pension scheme (31), equilibrium wages
(32) for periods t and t + 1, and the full employment condition (22) in (34) gives the equation of






























(1   )(1   b)
(1 + )(1 + )
2 (0;1); (36)










The dynamical system of the economy is given by (35) in conjunction with an initial value ~ K0 > 0.
The three statements of the following theorem establish the key results that we need for the analysis
of the link between population, pensions, and endogenous economic growth.
Theorem 1 Let  > 1=3.








> 0 for all ~ Kt > 0.





3. There is a function ~ K = ~ K (;b) with @ ~ K=@ < 0 and @ ~ K=@b < 0.





increasing on R++, i.e., as d ~ Kt > 0 the increase in output is more pronounced than the increase in
investment costs, both measured in units of ecient labor.
10The condition on  is sucient but by no means necessary for this results.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 14
Statement 2 assures the existence of at least one locally stable steady state. Hence, without a closed
form solution at hand, the focus of our analysis on steady-state eects is admissible.
The comparative statics of Statement 3 reveal that faster population growth and a higher contri-
bution rate reduce the steady-state capital intensity. Intuitively, in a steady state savings per unit
of ecient labor are such that all generations are equipped with the same amount of capital and
innovation investments per unit of ecient labor. Moreover, since the steady state is locally stable,
an increase in ~ K augments savings per unit of ecient labor by less than the investment needs
per unit of ecient labor. Then, a higher population growth rate has two reinforcing eects on ~ K.
First, it increases the amount of aggregate investments necessary to maintain a given steady-state
capital intensity. Given savings per unit of ecient labor this reduces ~ K (Solow eect). Second,
savings per unit of ecient labor falls since, ceteris paribus, faster population growth means a higher
pension benet in accordance with (31). The second nding of Statement 3 follows from the ob-
servation that the contribution rate aects the individual incentive to save through the well-known
income eects. An increase in b means a lower net wage when young and a higher benet when
old. Both eects reduce savings per unit of ecient labor. If such a hike occurs in a locally stable
steady state the value of ~ K must fall.
Finally, observe that the steady-state growth rate of all per-capita magnitudes in this economy is




. This follows from Lemma 1, the updating condition (16), and the equilibrium
conditions for the intermediate good market and for the labor market, (21) and (22), respectively.
Equilibrium output at t becomes Yt = K
t (AtLt)
1  such that output per worker at t may be
written as Yt=Lt = ~ K





3.3 Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth
What is the eect of population growth on the steady-state growth rate of the economy? It turns out
that the answer depends on particular properties of the pension scheme. The following proposition
has the result for the pension scheme with a constant contribution rate discussed above.
Proposition 1 Suppose the economy is in a locally stable steady state. If the pension system has











Hence, a decline in the population growth rate increases the steady-state growth rate of the economy,
q. The intuition is straightforward. According to Statement 3 of Theorem 1 a decline in the
population growth rate implies a higher steady-state capital intensity (Solow eect). Moreover, in
accordance with Lemma 1, the increased relative scarcity of labor means faster productivity growth
(Hicks eect).
Next, we consider the same economy except that the pay-as-you-go pension system stipulates a
constant replacement rate and not a constant contribution rate. How does the steady-state growth
rate of such an economy respond to a demographic change?Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 15
Consider, in accordance with (20), a constant replacement ratio  2 (0;1) that ties the benet when
old to the net wage of the current young, i.e.,
bt+1 =  wt+1(1   ^ b;t+1); (40)
where ^ b;t+1 adjusts such that the budget of the pension scheme is balanced. The ^ -notation
distinguishes the contribution rate under a constant replacement rate from b of the constant-
contribution-rate case. At all t the contribution rate consistent with a balanced budget of (31) and
(40) satises (1 + )^ b;t =  (1   ^ b;t), or, suppressing the time argument, we have
^ b =

 + 1 + 







Since the population growth rate is constant, so is the contribution rate. Faster population growth
reduces the dependency ratio such that a given replacement ratio can be supported with a lower
contribution rate. A higher replacement rate requires a higher contribution rate. On the one hand,
such an increase reduces benets when old, on the other hand, it increases the contributions paid
by the young.
Another important implication of (41) is that Statement 1 and 2 of Theorem 1 also apply here.
Indeed, given ~ K0 > 0 the evolution described by the dynamical system of (35) is the same under
a constant contribution rate and under a constant replacement rate if the right-hand sides of (31)
and (40) are equal, i.e., if
(1 + )b = (1   ^ b): (42)
Statement 3 of Theorem 1 needs to be modied. In view of (41) the relationship between the





@ ~ K (; ^ 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According to Theorem 1 and (41), all three partial derivatives are negative. Hence, the overall eect
of a decline in population growth on the steady-state capital intensity is ambiguous. The reason is
to be found in the relationship between changes in the population growth rate and the incentive
to save. Under a xed contribution rate, a decline in population growth reduces the expected
pension benet (see, (31)). Accordingly, savings increase. Under a constant replacement rate this
eect is weakened since a lower population growth rate also raises the contribution rate. Indeed,
from (31) and (41), we have bt+1 = (1 + ) ^ b (;) wt+1  bt+1 (; ^ b (;);wt+1). Therefore,
dbt+1=d = @bt+1=@ + (@bt+1=@^ b)(@^ b (;)=@), where the rst term is positive and the second
is negative. Of course, (40) implies that the overall eect remains positive such that the incentive
to save is weaker. Moreover, since a higher contribution reduces the net wage of the current young,
they also save less.
As to the eect of population growth on the steady-state growth rate of the economy under a
constant replacement rate we obtain the following result.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 16
Proposition 2 Consider an economy in a locally stable steady state. If the pension system has a
constant replacement rate, then q = g

~ K (; ^ b (;))








Proposition 2 holds since the direct eect of  on ~ K in (43) dominates the indirect eect through
^ b such that the overall eect is negative. Hence, under a constant replacement rate we expect
the economy's steady-state growth rate to increase following a decline in the population growth
rate just as under a constant contribution rate. However, according to the following proposition,
the strength of the steady-state response of the economy's growth rate to a demographic change
depends on the institutional design of its pension scheme.
Proposition 3 Consider an economy in a locally stable steady state. Suppose (42) is satised such






~ K (; ^ b (;))

. Then, the impact of a permanent decline in the
population growth rate on the steady-state growth rate is greater under a constant contribution rate



























Hence, the prediction is that a decline in the population growth rate increases the steady-state
growth rate of the economy by more if the pension scheme keeps the contribution rate constant.
The necessary increase of the contribution rate under a constant replacement rate discourages
savings. Hence, the induced change in ~ K will be less pronounced. We shall conrm this result in
our evaluation of the quantitative model in Section 6 (see, in particular Figure 7).
4 Calibration Strategy
In this section, we describe our calibration of the model parameters.
4.1 Demographics
Our projection of the US population demographics for 1950-2050 is taken from UN (2002). The
forecast for the US population development until 2400 is taken from Kr uger and Ludwig (2007).
These projections are based on the assumptions that life time expectancy increases at constant rates
until the year 2100 and that the number of newborns is constant after 2200. Figure 2 illustrates the
time prole of the population growth rate 1950-2400.11 We take this evolution as exogenous and
study the consequences for economic growth, pensions, and welfare.
11The depicted growth rates are computed for the population aged 20-94 in compliance with our model of Section 2.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 17
Figure 2: Actual and Predicted US Population Growth Rates
4.2 Endowments and Preferences
We choose the discount factor  = 1:011 in accordance with the empirical estimates of Hurd (1989)
who explicitly accounts for mortality risk.12 For our choice of , the real interest rate before taxes
amounts to 7.33% (6.25%) during 1990-2000 (at the end of the demographic transition). We set the
coecient of risk aversion  = 2:0. The parameter  = 0:32 of the utility function is calibrated so
that the average labor supply of the workers is approximately 0.30.
The s-year old household of type j has the productivity e(s;j) =  ysj. The age-eciency prole
f ysg45
s=1 is taken from Hansen (1993), interpolated to in-between years and normalized to one. The
set of the equally distributed productivity types f1;2g = f0:57;1:43g is taken from Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2004). With this calibration, we are able to replicate the empirical distribution
of US wages. In our model, the Gini coecient of the wage distribution is equal to 0.301 which
compares favorably with empirical values reported by, e.g., D az-Gim enez, Quadrini, and R os-Rull
(1997).
4.3 Production
The labor income share and the depreciation rate are set in accordance with Prescott (1986) implying
the values  = 0:35 and  = 0:08, respectively. The labor income (capital income) share in our
12Related research that uses such a value for  includes _ Imrohoro glu, _ Imrohoro glu, and Joines (1995) and Huggett
(1996). In the literature, the discount factor  has often been set smaller than one. In the Appendix, we study how
a lower value,  = 0:99, aects our result. Besides an unrealistically high interest rate both our qualitative and our
quantitative results remain virtually unaected.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 18
model amounts to 64.1% (35.0%), while research expenditure relative to GDP are equal to 0.93%.13
A central parameter of our model is the elasticity of the growth rate of labor productivity q with
respect to innovation investment i, 1=v. With an increasing value of 1=v, the endogenous growth rate
q becomes more sensitive to the exogenous variables of our model, in particular to the population
growth rate and to policy parameters in the hand of the government. The intuition for this comes
from Lemma 1 which states the link between the capital intensity in the nal-good sector, ~ K, and









































It measures the response of the equilibrium growth rate of technological knowledge to a change in





Hence, as v decreases the eect of a higher ~ K due to population aging on labor productivity is more
pronounced.
We derive an estimate for the value of v = 1:14 when we regress the log of the GDP per-capita
growth rate on the log of the R&D investment expenditure divided by GDP. We use annual time
series data for the US economy from 1973-2000. Data on business enterprize R&D expenditure in
current national prices are from OECD (1997) and OECD (2002a). Moreover, the price deator and
GDP data are from OECD (2002b).15 The parameter v0 is set equal to 1.407 implying an average
productivity growth equal to 1.80% over the years 1990-2000.
4.4 Government
The government share  g = G=Y is set equal to the average ratio of government consumption in
GDP,  g = 0:195 in the US during 1959-93 according to the Economic Report of the President (1994).
The tax rates w = 24:8% and r = 42:9% are computed as the average values of the eective US
tax rates over the time period 1965-88 that are reported by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).
The pension net replacement rate  = 0:50 is taken from _ Imrohoro glu, _ Imrohoro glu, and Joines
(1995). Government transfers, tr, and the social security contribution rate, b, are computed using
the equilibrium condition of the government budget (17) and the social security budget (20).
13One reason why the fraction of research expenditure in GDP is relatively small is that the model does not explicitly
account for above average salaries of researchers.




2 [0;1]. Moreover, in deriving this nding we
have to take into account the dependency of g on v as implied by (50).
15In our model, total investment expenditure, ntit, divided by total output, Yt, is equal to it= ~ K

t . Therefore, in
our regression, we make the identication assumptions that 1) the capital intensity ~ K is approximately constant in
the US during 1973-90, and 2) the productivity growth rate q is approximately equal to the GDP per-capita growth
rate. Moreover, R
2 = 0:42 and the standard deviation of the parameter 1=v (v) amounts to 0.218 (0.348).Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 19
4.5 Computation of the Transition Dynamics
To compute the transition dynamics presented in the next section, we assume that the US economy
attains a new steady state with zero population growth in the year 2400.16 In addition, we assume
an arbitrary steady state with 1.1% population growth in the year 1950. Given that we simulate
the economy starting in 1950, the initialization is found to have a small eect on the transition after
2000.
In a rst step, we make an initial guess of the time path of f ~ Kt; lt;b;t;~ trt;qtgt=2400
t=1950. We iterate
backwards in time and compute the household decisions of the newborn generation in each period
t = 2400;2399;:::;1950.17 In each period, we aggregate savings of all generations and compute








tg. We update the time path using the Gauss-Seidel-Quasi-Newton
algorithm presented by Ludwig (2007). In particular, we use the derivatives of the nal steady-
state equilibrium conditions with respect to ~ K,  l, b, ~ tr, and q to initialize the Jacobian matrix in
the Broyden algorithm. Moreover, we solve the model blockwise by rst solving the transition for
f ~ K1
t gt=2400




tg. In the next step, we solve the transition for f l1
tg




tg and so forth. When we tried to solve the model
for all endogenous aggregate variables simultaneously, the program did not converge. Therefore,
computational time is considerable and amounts to approximately 3 hours on a Pentium III, 860
MHz, for an accuracy chosen to be equal to 10 5 for both the individual decision rules and the time
path of the endogenous aggregate variables.
5 Demographic Transition and Economic Growth
In this section we study the evolution of the US economy implied by the demographic transition
depicted in Figure 2. As to the pension scheme we assume a constant pension replacement ratio
equal to  = 50% such that the social security contribution rate b;t adjusts to balance the budget
of the social security system. We refer to this setup as the benchmark economy.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we establish and interpret the evolution of the labor force,
the capital intensity, the factor prices, and the growth rate of technological knowledge, q, for the
period 1950-2200. Second, to identify the role of endogenous growth, we compare the benchmark
economy to an economy that diers in that growth is exogenous at a constant rate and costless,
i.e., q = 1:8% and i(1:8%) = 0.
5.1 Demographic Transition and Endogenous Growth
The transition from 1950 until 2200 is graphed in Figures 3 and 4 for the benchmark economy. As
the population ages, the share of the working age population falls from 88% in 1950 to 67% in 2200.
16In fact, the deviation of the steady-state capital intensity in 2400 from the computed capital intensity at the end
of the transition in period 2399 is less than 0.001%. Details on the transition until 2400 are given in the Appendix.
17To compute the individual household problem, we have to solve a non-linear equation system in two variables
which are the capital stocks of the 21-year old households with productivity 1 and 2, respectively. The methods are
described in more detail in Heer and Maussner (2008).Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 20
Therefore, the contribution rate to the social security system b;t increases from 5.2% to 14.0%.
Figure 3: Transition in the Benchmark Economy, Results I
The dynamics of the capital intensity, ~ K = K=AL, seems to reect the evolution of the labor force
share; as the aggregate ecient labor supply, L, declines, ~ K increases. However, the capital intensity
is also inuenced by general equilibrium eects that impinge on, e.g., the ability and willingness of
a declining labor force to save and the evolution of the level of technological knowledge, A. Overall,
the capital intensity is predicted to increase over time, though the evolution is not monotonous.
The dynamics of factor prices reects the one of the capital intensity; while the real wage rate w
increases in ~ K, the real interest rate r falls.
Since the growth rate of technological knowledge is tied to the capital intensity by the monotonous




, the evolution of q mimics the one of ~ K. The lower right diagram in Figure 3
shows that ^ qt increases from an average rate of 1.8% during 1991-2000 to 2.28% in 2100. As we
approach the steady state after 2200, ^ qt rises even further.18 In the steady state ^ qt = q = 2:38%
is constant and coincides with the growth rate of all per-capita magnitudes such as income and
consumption. Hence, our rst main result, we conclude that the demographic transition is associated
with an economically signicant increase of the long-run growth rate by 0.58 percentage points.
We may use these observations to shed some light on our interpretation of the data shown in Figure 1.
From Lemma 1, the updating condition (16), and the equilibrium conditions for the intermediate
good market and for the labor market, (21) and (22), respectively, we nd the equilibrium output
18All endogenous variables of the model like the capital stock per capita or the aggregate ecient labor supply per
capita stabilize around the year 2200. Indeed, in 2200 the transition is almost complete. The complete transition of
~ Kt and ^ qt until the year 2400 is shown in Figure 9 in Appendix 8.3.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 21
Figure 4: Transition in the Benchmark Economy, Results II
at t to equal Yt = K
t (AtLt)
1 . Then, output per ecient hour worked at t may be written as
Yt=Lt = ~ K
t At. Suppressing time subscripts and denoting the growth rate of some variable x by
gx, the growth rate of Y=L at all t is





Hence, growth of labor productivity has two sources. First, there is the direct contribution of growth
in ~ K, second there is the indirect contribution of ~ K on the growth of technological knowledge. As
population and eective labor decline, both channels contribute to the growth of labor productivity.




, i.e., the Hicks eect, is quantitatively much larger. For
instance, the model predicts average annual growth rates of labor productivity and technological
knowledge between 2000 and 2100 of 2:18% and 2:15%, respectively. Accordingly, growth in Y=L
is almost entirely due to the Hicks eect.
In the new steady state with a constant population, both the capital stock per capita K=AN and the
output per capita Y=AN (both measured in eciency units and not illustrated) are much smaller
than the corresponding values in 1950 where we started the computation assuming a steady state
with population growth equal to 1.1%. The per-capita capital stock and output decline by 13.7%
and 4.6%, respectively. Even though a decline in the fertility rate results in substantial capital
deepening and higher output per worker,19 the eect of the decline in the work force share in the
19Furthermore, we have a positive composition eect in the labor force as the share of high-productive old-age
workers in the total labor force increases.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 22
total population dominates. As the share of the working-age population falls, tax revenues also
decline. In order to balance the budget, government transfers are cut, especially during the rst
decades of 21st century. In 2200, government transfers are reduced by approximately 0.5% of total
consumption compared to 1950.
5.2 Endogenous versus Exogenous Growth
To highlight the role of endogenous innovation investments, we simplify the benchmark economy and
assume a production sector where q is constant at 1.8% and disregard the investment requirement
function i(q). Then, the growth rate of technological knowledge is exogenous, constant, and technical
change is costless. Indeed, these assumptions turn the production side of the economy into the one
of Solow (1956) with exogenous technical change and At = 1:018At 1.
At rst sight, the transition of the variables under exogenous growth looks similar to the one in the
benchmark economy with endogenous growth. For instance, Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the
capital intensity for the benchmark economy both with endogenous and exogenous growth. When
growth is exogenous, the capital intensity increases from the present over the next 100-200 years
showing similar swings as under endogenous growth. However, form 2000 onwards the level of ~ K is
smaller under endogenous growth. The rst reason for this dierence can be deduced from the lower
left graph of Figure 5: from 1993 onwards the growth rate of A is higher reecting the Hicks eect
which is absent when growth is exogenous. Then, similar to the neoclassical growth model with
exogenous technological change of Solow (1956), the capital intensity is smaller for higher growth
rates. Second, in the benchmark model not all invested resources are channeled towards capital
accumulation since innovation investments are costly.20
When growth is exogenous, a declining population aects labor productivity only through the Solow
eect in equation (47). Quantitatively, the increase in Y=L is much smaller even though ~ K rises
faster when growth is exogenous. In fact, the average annual growth rate of labor productivity
between 2000 and 2100 is only 1:87%, i.e., 14% lower than under endogenous growth.
This intuition helps to understand the dierential evolution of per-capita income under endogenous
and exogenous growth. The lower right graph of Figure 5 shows that, from 2007 onwards, Y=N
grows faster under endogenous growth. Using the same steps that let to the decomposition of
equation (47) we obtain per-capita output at t as Yt=Nt = (Lt=Nt) ~ K
t At. Accordingly, at t the
growth rate of Yt=Nt is
gY=N = gL=N + gY=L; (48)
i.e. the sum of the growth rate of ecient labor per capita and the growth rate of output per unit
of ecient labor.
Both under endogenous and exogenous growth we have in the steady state that gL=N = g ~ K = 0.
Hence, in the long run gY=N = 2:38% > 1:8%. In the short and medium run, (48) suggests that the
20The upper right graph of Figure 5 reveals that the evolution of L is very similar under endogenous and exogenous
growth. Hence, the eective labor supply cannot account for the dierential evolution of ~ K.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 23
Figure 5: Transition of ~ K, L, q, and the growth rate of Y=N in the Model with Endogenous and
Exogenous Growth
Hicks eect also dominates the evolution output per capita since the upper right graph of Figure 5
shows that during the transition gL=N is approximately the same under endogenous and exogenous
growth. Hence, starting in 2007, gY=N is higher under endogenous growth because of the Hicks
eect.
6 Population, Pensions, and Growth
In the previous section, we found that a decline in the population growth rate increases the growth
rate of technological knowledge. In this section, we ask whether and how the design of the pension
system aects this result. In Section 6.1 the focus is on possible growth eects. Since faster growth
is no end in itself, Section 6.2 turns to the comparison of individual welfare under dierent designs
of the pension scheme.
6.1 Comparative Analysis of Pension Reform Proposals
We consider the three scenarios of the pay-as-you-go pension scheme already introduced in Section 2:
1. constant replacement ratio, i.e., t = bt
(1 w b)wt lt =  = 50%. This is the benchmark
economy (solid line in the following gures),Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 24
2. constant contribution rate after 2010 (broken line). More precisely, the contribution rate
adjusts until 2010 before it remains constant at the level of b = 7:1%. We assume that this
policy change is fully anticipated by all economic agents.21
3. constant replacement ratio and later retirement at age 70, i.e., R = 51, for those agents born
in 2010 and afterwards (dotted line).
Figure 6 illustrates the dynamics of the US economy for the three pension reform scenarios under
endogenous growth. In the scenarios 1 and 3 (2), the contribution rate b (the replacement ratio of
the pensions ) adjusts in order to balance the social security budget. Consequently, pensions fall
in scenario 2 as  is reduced from 50.0% to 23.9%. In scenario 3, agents retire at age 71 if they are
born after 2010. Therefore, the burden on the pension system declines signicantly during 2055-59
when the cohorts of the 66 through 70-year old workers remain in the labor market. During this
period, the eective labor supply increases (see upper right picture of Figure 6) and the dependency
ratio falls. The social security contribution rates in the new steady states amount to 14.0%, 7.1%,
and 10.9% in the scenarios 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
In the scenarios 2 and 3, the lower social security contribution rates also increase the incentives
to supply labor as the net wage rate increases and the substitution eect dominates the income
eect. Therefore, the aggregate supply of ecient labor increases. In scenario 2, households also
accumulate higher savings for old age, while in scenario 3 households accumulate savings over a
longer working life. As a consequence, savings are also much higher in the scenarios 2 and 3. Since
both savings and the labor force increase, the net eect on the capital intensity is ambiguous. As
can be seen from the upper left picture in Figure 6, the capital intensity is higher in scenario 2 than
in the benchmark case, while it is approximately equal in the benchmark case and in the scenario
3 with the exception of the period 2055-70.
In all three scenarios, the evolution of the growth rate of technological knowledge q mimics the evo-
lution of ~ K. Therefore, the long-run change in q is largest in scenario 2 that keeps the contribution
rate b constant after 2010. As can be seen from Figure 7, qt rises from 1.80 during 1990-2000 to
2.73% in 2200.22 In both scenarios 1 and 3, qt is approximately at 2.38% in 2200. Since in 2200
the transition is almost complete we may interpret these numbers as the steady-state growth rates
of the respective scenarios. Then, the calibration exercise conrms the qualitative predictions of
Proposition 3: the eect of the demographic transition on the steady-state growth rate of the econ-
omy is larger under a constant contribution rate (scenario 2) than under a constant replacement
rate (scenario 1).
Summing up, we state as our second main result that the design of the pension system may have
large quantitative eects on the economy's growth rate.
21Appendix 8.4.2 has the case where this reform is not anticipated.
22However, even though the growth rate increases signicantly in scenario 2, it takes another 123 years until the
absolute level of the pensions overtakes the one in the benchmark case. The eect of the lower replacement ratio
dominates and lasts for many decades. For example in 2100, pensions are still 26% lower in scenario 2 than compared
to the benchmark.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 25
Figure 6: Transition Dynamics for Dierent Public Pension Reform Scenarios under Endogenous
Growth
6.2 Welfare under Endogenous and Exogenous Growth
This section addresses two questions. First, we ask how the three pension reform designs compare
in terms of welfare. Second, we want to know how the ranking of these proposals depends on
whether the growth rate is endogenous or exogenous. Our results suggest that such a ranking can
be established and that the negligence of growth rate eects of the social security system matters
for the rank order of the proposals.
To address these questions, we hypothesize that the average newborn of each generation knows her
lifetime utility associated with a life under each scenario. Equipped with this knowledge, she is able
to rank the scenarios according to the lifetime utility they deliver. Figure 8 displays this welfare
ranking for each generation born between 1960 and 2050. To provide an interpretable measure
of welfare, the vertical axis states the consumption equivalent change relative to the benchmark
economy with endogenous growth and a constant replacement rate. In other words, for all 6 scenarios
it states the percentage change of the life-time consumption prole for the average newborn that is
necessary to make her indierent to a life in the benchmark economy.23
Obviously, the welfare eects are large and public pension reform matters. For example, consider
the generation born in the year 2050. Under endogenous growth, the compensation in consump-
tion necessary to make the average newborn indierent between the benchmark economy and the
economy with a constant contribution rate amounts to 13.21% of total lifetime consumption, the
23Similarly, de Nardi, _ Imrohoro glu, and Sargent (1999) use wealth equivalent changes.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 26
Figure 7: Growth Rate Eects of Dierent Public Pension Reform Scenarios
dierence between the upper broken line and the solid horizontal line at 2050. Under exogenous
growth this compensation declines to 1.11%, the dierence between the lower solid and the lower
broken curve at 2050. Of course, these huge welfare eects represent dierences in the growth eects
of the individual pension reforms.
Our results with regard to the welfare eects of the public pension reform can be summarized as
follows:
1. The quantitative welfare eects of public pension reform proposals might be much larger if
growth is endogenous.
2. Endogenous productivity growth matters for the ranking of the pension reform proposals. For
instance, generations that enter the labor force between 1990-2010 support a pension reform
proposal that keeps the contribution rate b constant after 2010 under endogenous growth,
and they reject it under exogenous growth.
3. In the case of an increase in the retirement age, the generations born in the immediate decades
following the policy change suer. In the case of exogenous growth, welfare decreases for those
born during the next 25 years. In the case of endogenous growth, all future generations suer
until the year 2354.
4. To keep the burden of the pension system low, a freezing of the social security contribution
rate is preferable to an increase in the retirement age. Indeed, when growth is endogenous all
generations born after 1993 prefer scenario 2 where the contribution rate is constant.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 27
Figure 8: Welfare of Newborn Generations { Consumption Equivalent Change
As a caveat, let us mention that we do not interpret these results as being based on a comprehensive
welfare analysis of public pension reforms. Clearly, our analysis neglects features like public debt
and a pension system where benets are tied to previous contributions. Our point, however, is more
subtle. In fact, our results suggest that quantitative welfare results may depend on the assumption
of endogenous or exogenous growth. Therefore, welfare results concerning public pension reforms
that appear, e.g., in Huang, _ Imrohoro glu, and Sargent (1997) or de Nardi, _ Imrohoro glu, and Sargent
(1999) under exogenous growth may not be robust.
7 Concluding Remarks
In an economy where the production technology is endogenous, the investment decisions of rms
are guided by prot incentives. The evolution of the labor force, taken as exogenous by rms, is
then an important determinant of aggregate investment and growth. Moreover, a declining labor
force also aects an economy's ability to save and invest. The purpose of the present paper is to
study the interdependency of these aspects in a dynamic general equilibrium model and to assess
quantitatively the resulting eects on economic growth, pensions, and welfare for the US economy.
We nd that, as a consequence of the demographic transition, the US growth rates increases fromPopulation, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 28
1.8% during 1990-2000 to 2.28% (2.55%) in 2100 if the pension replacement ratio (contribution
rate) is kept at its current level. In addition, welfare increases for all generations born after 1993 if
the government keeps the pension contribution rate constant at the current level while pensions are
allowed to decrease. At the conceptual level, our results suggest that allowing for TFP growth to
be endogenous aects both the positive and the normative implications of large-scale OLG models
employed to study policy reform proposals of the social security system.
Our ndings suggests several promising routes for future research:
1. In our analytical framework technical change must be labor-saving at the level of intermediate-
good rms. In a next step, one would want to fully endogenize the direction of technical
change, e.g., in the spirit of Acemoglu (2003). While the literature on capital versus labor-
saving technical change may be interpreted as providing a reason for the technology to be more
labor than capital augmenting, both forms of technical progress occur along the transition
towards a steady state and aect the economy's growth rate.
2. On the household side, we assume a constant labor force participation rate. However, over
the last three decades, this rate has increased in the US from 58.9% in 1966 to 67.1% in 1998.
Since 1998, it has declined to 66.0% in 2005 basically due to cyclical eects (see, McEwen,
Orrenius, and Wynne (2005)). Intuitively, the labor force participation rate is likely to depend
on the demographic transition and the design of the public pension system. While a rising
participation rate reduces the relative scarcity of labor it is likely to increase aggregate savings
and capital accumulation through a rise in the economy's wage incomes. The net eect on
investment incentives is hitherto undetermined.
3. The level of technological knowledge used in an economy is the result of innovation investments
made throughout the world. Recently, Jones (2002) documented the relevance of this channel
for the evolution of the US economy during the period from 1950 to 1993. However, to
incorporate this link one needs to know the appropriate diusion process. In light of the
general formulation of such a process given in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), our specication
of the evolution of technological knowledge (see equation (16)) is the one of the world's single
technological leader. Clearly, more work needs to be done to quantify the relevant parameters
of a richer diusion process that applies to the US economy.
4. Globalization and market liberalization in many emerging countries, notably China and India,
account for a rising global labor force. As a matter of fact, population ageing is already a
predominant phenomenon in many of these countries including China, Japan, and Europe. In
an open economy, these developments are likely to aect wages and interest rates in a way
that may mitigate the eects emphasized in our paper. However, Kr uger and Ludwig (2007)
nd that the decline in the labor force in Europe and Japan implies a small increase of US
relative factor prices. With the Hicks eect in their framework such a small increase is likely
to raise the growth rate of the US economy. We leave the quantitative assessment of this eect
for future research.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 29
8 Appendix
8.1 Details on the Data for Figure 1
Figure 1 replicates and extends Figure 1 in Romer (1987). Accordingly, for the period 1899-1979
we use the same data as described in footnote 23, p. 182, of Romer's paper. For the period 1979-
1999, we use the same data sources that Romer uses for the time span 1949-1979. Hence, data
on man-hours for 1979-1999 is taken from Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table
B-47: Hours and Earnings in Private Nonagricultural Industries. The output measure is Gross
Private Domestic Product 1979-1999 as provided by the Department of Commerce. Labor Force
corresponds to the Total Civilian Labor Force as reported by the Department of Labor, Bureau
of Statistics, Table B-12: Labor Force, Employment and Unemployment and Table B-35: Civilian
Population and Labor Force. Growth of output per man-hour is equal to the growth of output
minus the growth in the labor force plus the growth in the rate of employment and minus growth
in average hours worked.
8.2 Proofs
8.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider equations (6), (7), (14) and (15) hold. Upon combining the latter two, we obtain
pt = [(1 + qt)iq(qt) + i(qt)](1 + rt) (49)
Acknowledging the dependency of pt and rt on ~ Kt through (6) and (7) in (49) gives
(1   ) ~ Kt
(1   ) ~ K1 
t + 
= (1 + ^ qt)iq(^ qt) + i(^ qt): (50)
Let LHS( ~ Kt) and RHS(^ qt) denote the left and the right-hand side of (50). One readily veries
that LHS( ~ Kt) satises
LHS(0) = 0; lim
~ Kt!1




= 1; and LHS0( ~ Kt) > 0 for all ~ Kt > 0: (51)
Similarly, in view of the specication of the input requirement function i of (10) we nd for RHS(^ qt)
the properties
RHS(0) = 0; lim
^ qt!1
RHS(^ qt) = 1; and RHS0(^ qt) > 0 for all ^ qt > 0: (52)
Hence, for each value ~ Kt  0 there is exactly one corresponding value ^ qt that satises (50). Moreover,
the function g must have the indicated properties. Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 30
8.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We prove each statement of the theorem separately starting with Statement 1. Recall that  = 1,
v0 = 1, and v = 2 such that i(q) = q2.
1. Implicit dierentiation of (35) gives
"







iq(g( ~ Kt))g ~ K( ~ Kt)
1   
!#
d ~ Kt = Z( ~ Kt+1)d ~ Kt+1: (53)
Here,
Z( ~ Kt+1)  g ~ K
h
2 ~ Kt+1 + 3 i
i
+ (1 + g)

2 + 3 iq g ~ K

; (54)
and the arguments of i is g and the one of g is ~ Kt+1. The properties of the function i and the






2iq(g( ~ Kt)) + (1 + g( ~ Kt))iqq(g( ~ Kt))
 g ~ K( ~ Kt) > 0 (55)














 0( ~ Kt) (56)
exists. To prove that 0( ~ Kt) > 0, we have to make sure that the numerator of (56) is greater
than zero for all ~ Kt > 0. Before doing this it is useful to prove the following claim.
Claim 1 Consider g ~ K( ~ K) of (55) and the investment requirement function (10) with v0 = 1
and v = 2. Then
lim
~ K!0






Proof If ~ K > 0, equation (55) implies that






2g( ~ K) + (1 + g( ~ K))

: (58)
Since i(0) = iq(0) = 0, (50) implies that lim ~ K!0 g( ~ K) = 0. Hence,
lim
~ K!0
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2iq + (1 + g)iqq
> 0; (60)
where the argument of i is g and the argument of g is ~ Kt. The fraction i= ~ Kt is increasing in ~ K






iiq holds for the investment requirement function specied in (10). Finally, using l'H^ opital's







iq(g( ~ Kt)g ~ K( ~ Kt) = 0: (61)










which can be shown to be strictly positive for all  > 1=3 as stated in the theorem.

2. The steady state is determined by (35) for ~ K = ~ Kt = ~ Kt+1. We show that the right-hand
side, RHS( ~ K), and the left-hand side, LHS( ~ K), of (35) intersect on ~ K > 0 at leaste once.
First, consider
RHS( ~ K) 

1 + g( ~ K)
h
2 ~ K + 3 i(g( ~ K))
i
: (63)
This function is bounded from below, i.e., RHS( ~ K) > 2 ~ K for all ~ K > 0. From the proof of
Claim 1, we also have RHS(0) = 0. Moreover,
RHS0( ~ K) = g ~ K( ~ K)
h




1 + g( ~ K)
h






RHS0( ~ K) = lim
~ K!0
n
g ~ K( ~ K)
h




1 + g( ~ K)
h
2 + 3 iq(g( ~ K))g ~ K( ~ K)
io
= 2 (65)
since lim ~ K!0 g ~ K( ~ K) is positive and nite.
Next, consider the function
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This function is bounded from above, i.e., 1 ~ K > LHS( ~ K) for all ~ K > 0 and satises
lim ~ K!0 LHS(0) = 0. To verify the latter we note that
lim
~ K!0














(1   )2 lim
~ K!0




(1   )2 lim
~ K!0
iq g ~ K ~ K = 0; (67)
where the second step uses l'H^ opital's rule and the last step applies arguments of the proof of
Claim 1.
Since  > 1=3, the term in brackets on the left-hand side of (53) is strictly positive for ~ K > 0.
Therefore, LHS0( ~ K) > 0. Moreover, we have
lim
~ K!0
LHS0( ~ K) = lim
~ K!0
"















~ K1  + lim
~ K!0
 
(1   )i   iq g ~ K ~ K
(1   ) ~ K2 
!#
: (69)
The rst limit is plus innity whereas l'H^ opital's rule applied to the second limit gives
 1





















To study the last two terms of (70) we use (50) to derive
g ~ K ~ K =  g2
~ K

3iqq + (1 + g)iqqq
2iq + (1 + g)iqq

: (71)
Using the latter and v = 2, these two terms become
lim
~ K!0
(g ~ K)2 ~ K

(1 + g)(iqq)2   iqq iq   (1 + g)iq iqqq




(g ~ K)2 ~ K

4(1 + g)   4g










From Claim 1 we know that lim ~ K!0 g ~ K = (1   )=(2). Hence, the limit in (72) is zero.




iq g ~ K
~ K1 








2v gv 1 + (1 + g)v(v   1)gv 2

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Evaluated at v = 2 and using l'H^ opital's rule gives




~ K1 (1 + 3g)





3g ~ K ~ K1  + (1 + 3g)(1   ) ~ K 
!
= (1   ) lim
~ K!0
 
~ K g ~ K
3g ~ K ~ K + (1 + 3g)(1   )
!
= 0: (74)
Hence, the expression (70) vanishes in the limit such that
lim
~ K!0








Since 2 is nite, the comparison of (65) to (75) leads to the conclusion that LHS( ~ K) >
RHS( ~ K) for ~ K arbitrary close to ~ K = 0. In addition, the fact that RHS( ~ K) > 2 ~ K




that satises LHS0( ~ K) < RHS( ~ K). Then, at ~ K we have 0( ~ K) =
LHS0( ~ K)=RHS( ~ K) < 1 and the steady state is locally stable. 









. Taking the dierential with












  RHS ~ K

~ K;2;3
 > 0: (76)
The sign follows since LHS1 > 0 and local stability implies LHS ~ K < RHS ~ K.










Turning to the relationship between ~ K and b we need to take into account that 1, 2, and
























  RHS ~ K

~ K;2;3
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Again, due to local stability the denominator is negative. The rst term of the numerator is




































From the proof of Statement 2, the term in brackets is positive. Hence, it follows that
d ~ K=db < 0. 
8.2.3 Proof of Proposition 1







= g ~ K( ~ K (;b))




8.2.4 Proof of Proposition 2



















where the argument of ~ K is (; ^ b (;)). To proof the proposition, we show that the term in
brackets of (81) is negative for all admissible parameter values.




















where the argument of LHS is

~ K; ^ 1

, the one of RHS is

~ K; ^ 2; ^ 3

, and the one of ~ K is
(; ^ b (;)). From the denitions of ^ i, i = 1;2;3 and the fact that the derivatives are evaluated at
the steady state, we derive that (82) can be written as




^ 2 ~ K + ^ 3i
1   ^ b
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Using (41) to substitute for ^ b, condition (83) becomes
















( + 1 + )
2 > 0: (84)
With ^ i, i = 1;2;3, one readily veries that inequality (84) holds for all admissible parameter values.
Hence, the term in brackets of (81) is negative. With Lemma 1 the proposition follows. 
8.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3







= g ~ K( ~ K)
"
@ ~ K (; ^ b (;))
@
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= g ~ K( ~ K)
@ ~ K (; ^ b (;))
@
+ g ~ K( ~ K)












+ g ~ K( ~ K)





where the last step makes use of Proposition 1 and the fact that b = ^ b (;). Since the last term
in (87) is positive the proposition is proved. 
8.3 Computation Details
As mentioned in the main text, we assume that the transition is complete in the year 2400. Figure 9
presents the complete transition from 1950 to 2400 for the capital intensity, ~ Kt, and the endogenous
growth rate, qt. These time paths suggest that the economy is in its new steady state from 2200
onwards.
8.4 Sensitivity Analysis
8.4.1 Investment Requirement Function
The critical parameter in our analysis is the elasticity of the growth rate of productivity, q, with
respect to innovation investment, i. Since i = v0 qv, this elasticity is equal to 1=v. From our regres-
sion of the log of the GDP per capita growth rate on the log of the R&D investment expenditure
divided by GDP we estimated a value equal to v = 1:14. The closer the value v is to one, the higher
will be the quantitative eect of population ageing on the growth rate.
In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of the growth rate eect of population aging on the choice
of v. In particular, we determine an estimate for the lower bound of the quantitative growth rate.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 36
Figure 9: Complete Transition in the Benchmark Economy
We choose v = 1:14 + v = 1:49, where v is the standard deviation of v derived from the above
empirical regression analysis for the US economy during 1973-2000.24 The parameter v0 = 4:385
is chosen so that the average growth rate during 1990-2000 is equal to 1.80% as in the benchmark
economy. In this case, the share of expenditure on research and development relative to GDP falls
to 0.71% and is in less accordance with empirical numbers than for the case with v = 1:14.
Figure 10 presents our results. For v = 1:49 (v = 1:14), the growth rate rises from 1.8% during
1990-2000 to 2.11% (2.38%) in 2200. The relative increase of the growth rate remains substantial,
however, it is certainly smaller than the one computed for the benchmark case.
8.4.2 Perfect Foresight versus Unexpected Policy Changes
In Section 6, we analyze the pension reform that switches from a constant replacement ratio of
pensions relative to net average wages (t = 0:5 for t  2010), to a constant contribution rate
(b;t = b;2010 for t > 2010) in the year 2010. In our computations, we assume that the change in
the pension policy is fully anticipated. In this Appendix, we study the alternative scenario where
the households do not learn about this policy change until the end of the year 2010.
In Figures 11 and 12, the transition dynamics of the aggregate supply of ecient labor, L, and
24In our regression, we estimate b 1
v = 0:953 with a standard deviation equal to 0.218. In order to derive the mean
and the standard deviation of our estimate for v, we generate 1 million normally distributed random variables xi with
a standard deviation equal to 0.218, compute the values vi = 1=(0:953 + xi) and the associated sample mean and
standard deviation. Basically the same value results from a computation that employs bootstrapping methods.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 37
Figure 10: The Growth Rate q in the Benchmark Economy for v = 1:14 and v = 1:49
the capital intensity, ~ K, are illustrated for the benchmark case (with constant replacement ratio
t = 0:5 for all t), and for the two cases of an unexpected and an expected policy change involving
a constant contribution rate for t > 2010. If the policy change is unexpected, the time paths of
the two variables coincide with the one of the benchmark case until the year 2010. Afterwards, L
decreases temporarily (the dotted line falls below the solid line until 2020), even though only to a
very small extent. Households increase their relative labor supply in old age at the expense of their
labor supply in young age because, in comparison to the benchmark case, the contribution rates b;t
in old age are much lower so that the net wages are higher. As the substitution eect is stronger
than the income eect, labor supply in the later years of their working life increases.
In addition, households learn in 2010 that their pensions will be lower than expected. As a con-
sequence, they increase savings, especially in old age. Compared to the case with perfect foresight
(broken line), the capital intensity ~ K is always lower. As the growth rate, qt, is a monotone function
of the capital intensity, growth is also higher in the case of an expected policy change. In 2037, the
two transition paths display the maximum dierence between the two growth rates amounting to
0.14 percentage points (not illustrated). Clearly, the unexpected change in policy results in a short
and medium-run decline of the compounded growth rate.
8.4.3 Sensitivity with Respect to the Discount Factor 
Figures 13 and 14 display the transition dynamics for a lower discount factor  = 0:99. For
this choice of the discount factor, the real interest rates are much higher than for our benchmark
calibration and increase to values between 9.4%-11.1% during 1950-2100. Apart from this, all
our qualitative results hold. In particular, the growth rate of productivity q increases from 1.8%
during 1990-2000 to 2.20% in 2100 and even 2.27% in the long run. All remaining qualitative andPopulation, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 38
Figure 11: Eects of Policy Announcement on Aggregate Eective Labor
quantitative results concerning the pension reform under endogenous and exogenous growth are
available upon request from the authors.Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 39
Figure 12: Eects of Policy Announcement on the Capital Intensity
Figure 13: Transition in the Economy with  = 0:99, Results IPopulation, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 40
Figure 14: Transition in the Economy with  = 0:99, Results IIPopulation, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth 41
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